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 also shown that under more normal circumstances explicit recognition has
to be given to initial conditions, such as inflationary expectations em-
bodied in the wage-price mechanism' in order to ensure desirableresults
Unfortunately, the procedures to eliminate these problems require de-
stroying the dichotomy between preferences and constraints. When initial
conditions are the primary focus for consideration of "exogenous" forces
it is suggested that the desired relationship between initial conditions and
longrun targets be reflected in the weights assigned to the individual
terms in the objective function. In this way, the specification that desired
unemployment and inflation both be zero is maintained. For this reason,
this approach appears more reasonable than truncating the quadratic or
exponential function at some point.
The specification of the objective function that eliminates these con-
siderations, and thus preserves dichotomy between preferences and con-
straints, is linear.Itis shown, however, that penalizing deviations of
unemployment and inflation linearly fails to adequately capture the full
effects of particular policies because of the truncatedhorizon.2The bias
appears to be possibly eliminated when no gain is permitted to be regis-
tered in the objective function for values of the unemployment rate less
than the estimated long-run natural rate of the MPS model. The rationale
for this procedure is based on the consideration that long-run acceleration
or deceleration of prices is not desirable. This rationale is admittedly
weak, though, because extended periods of unemployment below its
natural rate value, may, in fact, be desirable. The solution to the horizon
problem, however, remains to be discovered. While terminal conditions
can be specified in the objective function, a reasonablespecification of
them is quite difficult to arrive at, and none are suggested here.
In Section I the framework of the analysis will be discussed. In Sec-
tion II the effects of maximizing objective functions specified as linear,
truncated quadratic or exponential, with unemployment and inflation as
arguments, will be analyzed. The constraints will consist of theMPS
quarterly econometric model.
An objective function should represent preferences accurately. There
could be difficulties in doing so, however, in the case of a quadratic func-
tion with the unemployment rate as argument. The well-known symmetry
property associated with a quadratic function implies thatafter some
point lower values of unemployment are penalized just as heavily as
These expectations are estimated to be extremelystickyin the short run. This im-
plies that an objective function that calls for their elimination may entail extremede-
flationary optimal control.
2The most likely case of a truncated horizon is the standard econometric lorecast.
This
is usually restricted to eight to twelve quarters into the future, which places aphysical limit
on the horizon. This limit, however, may not equal that which isdesired.
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276higher values. It hasbeen argued by many, however,that low levels of
employmeh1t are undesirable only to the extent that they lead to high
rates ofinflation. Therefore, it is further argued that the inflationrate
should be included in the objective function, as well. However, if both
nemp1oyment and inflation are represented through quadratic terms,
there would be, in a sense, double counting. If the unemployment rate is
specified alone in the objective function with the rationale that symmetric
penalization accomodates preferences concerning inflation becauseunem-
ployment and inflation are to a large extent inversely related in the model,
then weak dichotomy between preferences and constraints is destroyed.
consequently, the implicit relative weight on inflationmay not correctly
reflect true preferences, because it depends on system dynamics.
A common correction of the symmetry problem ofa quadratic func-
tion is to truncate the latter at some point. Truncation means that below
some point no gain is registered for pushing the unemployment or infla-
tion rate further downward. If an arbitrary point is usedto truncate the
unemployment-inflation space than the question ofrationale might again
be raised. It could be argued that there is noreason to disallow a gain in
unemployment below the truncation point unless itexcessively exacer-
bates inflation, which, however, is alreadyincorporated in the objective
function. Furthermore, any argument in favorof truncation at an arbi-
trary point that is in terms of the unemploymentinflationmodel trade-off
would violate the property of weak dichotomybetween preferences and
constraints.
If a point on the long-run Phillip'scurve is used to truncate the
quadratic, then the role of the controlhorizon must be examined. When
the horizon is sufficiently longso that all the effects of the policy instru-
ments are registered in the objectivefunction then strong dichotomy be-
tween preferences and constraints ispossible and such truncation is not
necessary. However, when all the effectsof the policy instrumentsare not captured by the objective function,then weak dichotomy between pref-
erencesand constrainsas is embodied in such truncationmight be neces- sary If the effects beyond thehorizon were not taken intoaccount, then the optimal policy couldbe biased in favor ofone target or the other. Given that the horizoneffects are acceptably accountedfor, the ques- ion arises as to howto specify preferencesover unemployment and in- ation within the horizon,assuming at least weak dichotomy.In par- ticuIar, how shoulddeviations ofunemployment or inflation fromzero (in
values (in the case of weak
hichotomy) be penalized The issuecenters on whether the deviations uld be penalizedlinearly, bya truncated quadratic,or exponentially. enerally, suchdeviations wouldbe penalized most heavily throughan )Cponential, lessso by a truncatedquadratic and least bya linear func-
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277tion. This is because in the exponential or quadratic cases the relative
weights given to target variables (either among them or over time) are
functions of the space at which the objective function is evaluated. Fur-
thermore, the derivatives of an exponential with respect to target variables
are respectively greater than those of atruncated quadratic everywhere.
The relative weights given to target variables are independent of the state
of the economy with a linear function.
Whether more or less penalty on deviations from, say, zero is desired
depends on the aspects of the problems at hand. In [I] it was argued that
huge exogenous shocks increased the rate of inflation in 1973-74, which if
not offset in an exponential or quadratic objective function wouldlead to
undue weight on inflation and an excessively deflationary optimal policy.
The undesirably high, implicit weight given to inflation in the exponential
was eliminated by applying multiplicative, time-varyingweights, as in
equation (I), that deemphasized the impact of the exogenous shocks in
1974. This procedure, however, violated the property of weak dichotomy
between preferences and constraints. Alternative approaches to the prob-
lem will be explored below.
(I) W =[_ajeui - b
whereu, = unemployment rate in period i
p, = inflation rate in period i
Under more normal circumstances some penalty on high values of
unemployment or inflation is desirable. This is particularly true for high
values of unemployment or inflation that result from policy actions. How-
ever, simple specification of such a consideration in theobjective function,
i.e., by penalizing deviations exponentially, linearly or by truncated quad-
ratic, may yield some qualitative differences in the final result depending
on the particular functional specification. For instance,the optimal se-
quence of unemployment may be oscillatory in one case but notin
another.
The optimal sequences of unemployment and inflation result from
the interaction of the objective function and model constraints. Examina-
tion of the constraints is necessary in order to analyze the results pre-
sented below. The MPS wage-price mechanism consists of a Phillips
curve-type relationship to explain the rate of change of wages and a
mark-up equation on expected minimized labor costs3 to explain prices.
The relationship between unemployment and inflation is most strongly
3Theoreticaily, the mark-up should be on minimized average total costs. However,
the rental rate of capital did not figure significantly in estimation.
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278modeled through the wage equation, although themark-up and produc-
tivity are dependent on demand conditions tosome extent. The wage
equation is basically specified as:
(Lw\ Ib(u - u_1) (2) a.- + c1p1
where W = wages a > ü
u = unemploymentb > 0
p = inflation rate =I
A change in the unemployment rate will havean immediate effect on the
rate of change of wages through the first two explanatoryterms of equa-
tion (2). The effect of the rate of change of the unemploymentrate on the
rate of change of wages is temporary, however. Since pricesare dependent
on wages, though, the rate of change of prices will change and, inaccord-
ance with the distributed lag on the latter in equation (2), whichproxies
for inflationary expectations or as a "catch-up"term, will slowlyin-
fluence wages over time. Thus, apermanent change in the unemployment
rate will have a contemporaneous effect on wages throughthe first and
second terms and a lasting effect through the firstand thirdterms.4An
additional characteristic of this equation isthat since the sum of the
coefficients in the distributed lag on pastrates of change of prices equals
unity, a natural rate of unemployment is implied.The implicit natural
rate of unemployment is approximately 4.5 percent in themodel. Unem-
ployment rates in the long-run above the naturalrate will cause continual
deceleration of inflation, while those belowthe natural rate will cause con-
tinual acceleration of inflation.
The timing of the effects of unemploymentoninflation5plays an im-
portant role in the determination of optimal policy. Ifthe horizon is not
long enough to account for all the impact ofchanges in unemployment on
inflation, the optimal policymay be biased in favor of too muchor too
little stimulus. This will be called the horizoneffect. Excluding this pos-
sibility, the lag between changes inunemployment and their full effecton
inflation can still be a significant influenceon the optimal solution. In
particular, since the effects ofa change in the unemployment rate are felt
over time, the decision whethera given change in unemployment is de-
sirable depends partlyon how the future effects of such changeare valued.
With a linear specification ofcosts, the decision will be influenced by
4Because of the specification of theinverse of the unemploymentrate in equation (2),
the n1argina eirecton wages from changes in the unemployment rate is dependenton the level of unemployment Themarginal etlect will decline as the unemploymentrate rises.
5The effect of a change inwages on prices is immediate, although it might be offsetto
some extent through a change in productivityor in the markup.
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279whether the cumulativeeffects on inflationresulting from the changein
unemployment are greater orless than the cumulativechange in the un-
employment rate. If one movesto quadratic orexponential representa-
tion of costs, thecomparison will be betweenthe quadratic orexponential
transformations of the changesin unemployment andinflation. Generally,
exponential and quadraticfunctions penalize upwardmovements in their
arguments moreheavily than they rewarddownward movements, as-
suming that their arguments areinitially equal in value(or equidistant
from long-run desiredtargets). Thus, the delayedincreases in inflation
from a fall in unemploymentshould be valued relativelygreater than they
would be linearly. Onthe other hand, thedelayed declines ininflation
from a rise in unemploymentshould be valued relativelyless than they
would be linearly.Consequently, one should expectrelatively less extreme
trade-offs betweenunemployment and inflation overtime in the case of
quadratic and exponentialobjective functionscompared to that oflinear
functions. In other words, oneshould expect oscillationsof smaller ampli-
tude over time of theunemployment rate whenpreferences are repre-
sented by quadratic orexponential functionscompared to linear func-
tions.
In practice, both thehorizon and oscillationeffects will co-exist. The
horizon effect is undesirable.The oscillation effect may ormay not be so;
it is a characteristicof a particular objectivefunction that should be
weighed.when deciding thelatter's desired specification.The question of
which effect dominates acontrol solution must bedetermined through
experimentation. This willbe conducted in the nextsection.
II
Empirical Results
In this section theimplications of using linear,truncated quadratic
and exponential objectivefunctions will be examinedwith the MPS model
as constraints.6The experiments willbe conducted over twotime periods.
The first, 1971-75, wasmarked by huge exogenousshocks to prices in
l973-74. The second,1965-69, was less subject tomajor exogenous
shocks.8
Some loose criteriawill be used to judge theimplications of the dif-
ferent objective functions.First, if the optimalsolution calls for extreme
worsening on the part of onetarget which does notlead to substantial
6The residuals of the equations wereadded backso that the modeltracks history
without error when the historicalpolicies are simulated.
7See [1] for an analysis of theseshocks.
tWhile both fiscal and monetarypolicy can be consideredextraordinary in some re-
spects during this periodthey are endogenous to the controlproblem.
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improvements on the part of the other target, thenthat objective function
which yields this result will be consideredundesirable Second, the long-
run level of the unemployment rate that is consistent witha negligible rate
of inflation (0 percent to 2 percent) has beenestimated by many to have
been between 4-4.5 percent in the l960'sand to have rise to between
4.5-5.5 percent in the l970's. Therefore, incognizance of the horizon ef-
fect, optimal policy that pushes theunemployment rate below 4 percent in
1965-69 period or 4.5 percent in the 1971-75period, especially towa,ds
the end of the period under control, will beConsidered unacceptable This,
unfortunately, is a tenuous criterionAlthough unemployment rates be-
low these levels could be associated in thelong-run with a higher than de-
sirable or Possibly even accelerating inflation,it is not necessarily unde-
sirable to have such low unemploymentrates for extended periods of time.
However, this criterion will beused because the instances in which the
unemployment rate is driven below these minimum levelsappear to be
associated with the horizon effect.
The first period under examinationèontained huge shocks to the
economy.9 As was mentioned above, theobjective function used inlJ,
violated the property of weak dichotomybetween preferences aiidcon-
straints.'0 However, it was also shown inIlJ that an objective function that
was less guilty of violating weak dichotomy ledto UnaccptabJy high lev-
els of unemployment with little improvementin inflation" In other
words, the first criterion wasnot satisfiedTherefore, to determine an
acceptable objective function it is necessaryto find one that satisfies at
least weak dichotomy and the othertwo criteria just mentioned.
The first objective function to bemaximized 2 is the linear function:
9See Table I, column (a) for the historicalvalues of unemployment and inflation. The
rate of change of the GNP deflator is used throughoutthe paper to represent inflation.
'°See Table 1, column (b) for theseresults.
'1See Table I, column (c) for theseresults
121n all the problems below, unlessotherwise mentioned, the Treasury bill rate and
Federal Government nondefense,nonwage expenditures were used to maximize the objec-
tive function For the 1971-75 period thefollowing inequality constraints Were ineect:
3RTB<l3
RTB<.5*RTB
For the l965_69 period theconstraint on EGF was changed to:
55.EGF85.
where RTBTreasury bill rate
EGFFederal Government spending (1958$)
These constraintsare meant to ensure that the analysis will be pertinentto relevant applica- tion of optimal control toeconomic policy problems
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281(3) w-_-(u+p)
Since both desired uand p are specifiedto be as low aspossible, this fiinc-
tion satisfies strongdichotomy. Furthermore,as it is linear,its derivatives
are independentof the .stte ofthe economy. Thus,it avoids theproblem
of having undueweight given to oneof the targets becauseof exogenous
shocks to the economy.The results ofmaximizing equatiO.n (3) areshown
in Table I column(d). As can be seen,unemployment is driven toextra-
ordinary low levelsin 1974. Thisviolates the minimumvalue criterion
and vitiates theusefulness of thisobjective function as itstands. It is most
likely that thehorizon effect isresponsible for the lowvalues of unem-
ployment in1974.13
TABLE 1
RESULTSoF MAXIMIZINOOBJECTIVE FUNCTIONSOVER PERIOD
MARKEP BY HUGEEXOGENOUS SHOCKS
u = unemploymentrate
prate o.f change of Gt"J Pdeflator
Column (a)historical values
objective function underlyingcolumn (b) =(_e-e). where fi
obtained from an ad hocpolicy described in [1.
objective functionunderlying column (c) =(-e5 -
objective function underlyifl8column (d)(-uP)
objective function underlyingcolumn (e)(-e)
objective function underlyingcolumn (f)7 (-(u4)-p)
3The unemployment rateincreases alter1974.3 because theinequality constraints
on the policy instrumentswere binding inthose quarters.
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In order to mitigate the horizon effect the following objectivefunc-
tion was maximized:
W=
The acceleration of the penalty onp as p increases should prevent un-
employment from being pushed as low as it was in equation (3).Further-
more, since the derivative of W with respect to u or p is the
problem of undue weight given to one of the target variables because of
exogenous shocks to the economy is eliminated. Finally, strong dichotomy
is maintained.
The results are given in Table 1 column (e). While theunemployment
rate does not decline as much in 1974 as it does in column (d), it is still
too low. In addition, the unemployment rate is pushed to fairly high lev-
els in 1972, 1973, 1975, causing a moderate reduction in the inflationrate.
These results can be explained from the observation that theexogenous
component of p in 1974, while it does not impose undue weighton p rela-
tive to u in 1974, does increase the weighton u and p in 1974 relative to
their values in the other quarters. Thus, unemployment is pushedup in
197 1-73 in order to reduce the contribution of the distributed lagon past
rates of change of prices to the inflation rate in 1974. In other words,this
objective function is biased in favor of unemployment arid inflationin
1974.
Another possible way of taking account of post horizon considera-
tions is to only penalize upward deviations of unemploymentand inflation
from their long-run desired or model consistent values, Theidea here is
that all the effects of decreasing unemploymentare not registered in the
objective function because of the truncated horizon. Therefore,reducing
unemployment below its long-run value should not be consideredgainful.
However, for reasons mentioned above, this approach mightbe overly
restrictive for correct representation of short-run preferences.Neverthe-
less, the following objective functionwas maximized:
W.=[-(u4.5)- p1
This function satisfies weak dichotomy and its derivativesare independent
of the state of economy when theunemployment rate does riot equal 4.5
percent. The results are shown in Table 1 Column (f). Theyappear to be
the most reasonableso far, although the horizon effect may be having too
much influence after 1974:2. Remarkably, theresults are extremely sim-
ilar to those in Column (b), whichwere obtained through an objective
function that violated weak dichotomy.14
4The policy assumptions that underly the results givenin column (b) and (c) include a
reduction in the OASI tax in 1974.1 and 1974.2. This helpsto exlaln the smaller rate of in-















































































































































































































































andwereIn order to mitigate the horizoneffect the followingobjective func- tion was maximized:
(4) W=['e+P)]
The acceleration of the penaltyon p as p increases shouldprevent un- employment from being pushedas low as it was in equation(3). Further- more, since the derivative of W withrespect to z, or p is the problem of undue weight givento one of the target variablesbecause of exogenous shocks to the economy is eliminated.Finally, strong dichotomy is maintained.
The results are given in Table1 column (e). While theunemployment rate does not decline as much in 1974as it does in column (d), itis still too low. In addition, the unemploymentrate is pushed to fairly highlev- els in 1972, 1973, 1975, causinga moderate reduction in theinflation rate. These results can be explainedfrom the observationthat the exogenous component of p in 1974, while it doesnot impose undue weighton p rela- tive to u in 1974, does increasethe weight onu and p in 1974 relativeto their values in the otherquarters. Thus, unemployments pushed up in 1971-73 in order to reducethe contribution of thedistributed lag onpast rates of change of prices to theinflation rate in 1974.In other words, this objective function is biasedin favor ofunemployment and inflationin 1974.
Another possible way of takingaccount of post horizonconsidera- tions is to only penalizeupward deviations ofunemployment and inflation from their long-run desiredor model consistent values,he idea here is that all the effects of decreasingunemployment are not registeredin the objective function becauseof the truncatedhorizon. Therefore, reducing unemployment below its long-runvalue should not beconsidered gainful. However, for reasonsmentioned above, thisapproach might be overly restrictive for correctrepresentation of short-runpreferences Neverthe- less, the following objectivefunction was maximized:
(5) W=[-(u4.5)- p]
This function satisfiesweak dichotomy and itsderivatives are Independent of the state ofeconomy when the unemploymentrate does not equal 4.5 percent. The results are shownin Table 1 Column(f). They appearto be the mostreasonable so far, although thehorizon effectmay be having too much influence after1974:2. Remarkably,the results areextremely sim- ilar to those inColumn (b), whichwere obtained throughan objective function that violatedweak dichotomy.'4
'4The policyassumptions that underly the results givenincIurnn (b) and (c) includea reduction in the OASItax in974. and 974.2. This helpsto exldin thsmaller rate of in- flaton in thesequarters compared to the other columns.
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In order to mitigate the horizoneffect the followingobjective func- tion was maximized:
(4) W=
The acceleration of the penaltyon p as p increases shouldprevent un- employment from being pushedas low as it was in equation(3). Further- more, since the derivative of W withrespect to u1 orP is the problem of undue weight givento one of the target variablesbecause of exogenous shocks to the economy is eliminated.Finally, strong dichotomy is maintained.
The results are given in TableI column (e). Whilethe unemployment rate does not decline as much in1974 as it does in column(d), it is still too low. In addition, theunemployment rate is pushedto fairly high lev- els in 1972, 1973, 1975, causinga moderate reduction in theinflation rate. These results can be explainedfrom the observationthat theexogenous component ofp in 1974, while it doesnot impose undue weighton p rela- tive to u in 1974, does increasethe weight onu and p in 1974 relativeto their values in the otherquarters. Thus, unemploymentis pushed up in 1971-73 in order to reduce thecontribution of the distributedlag on past rates of change of prices to theinflation rate in 1974. Inether words, this objective function is biasedin favor ofunemployment and inflationin 1974.
Another possible way of takingaccount of post horizonconsidera- tions is to only penalizeupward deviations ofunemployment and inflation from their long-run desiredor model consistent values,The idea here is that all the effects ofdecreasing unemploymentare not registered in the objective function because ofthe truncated horizon.Therefore, reducing unemployment below its long-runvalue should not beconsidered gainful. However, for reasonsmentioned above, thisapproach might be overly restrictive for correctrepresentation of short-runpreferences. Neverthe- less, the followingobjective functionwas maximized:
(5) W= E[-(u4.5)- p]
This function satisfiesweak dichotomy and itsderivatives are independent of the state ofeconomy when the unemploymentrate does not equal 4.5 percent. The results are shown inTable 1 Column (f).They appear to be the mostreasonable so far, although thehorizon effectmay be having too much influence after1974:2. Remarkably,the results areextremely sim- ilar to those inColumn (b), whichwere obtained throughan objective function that violatedweak dichotomy.'4
'4The policyassumptions that underly the resultsgiven in column (b) and(c) include a reduction in the OASI tax in974.! and I 974.2. This helpsto expuin the smallerrate of in- flation in thesequarters compared to the other columns.
283TABLE 2
HISTORICAL AND MAXIMIZATION RESULTSFOR A "NORMAL" PERIOD
lastly linear. Thus, the net gain from decreasingunemployment at the end
of the period is relatively lowest inthe exponential case.
An approach to specification of theobjective function that takesex-
plicit cognizance of differences inthe levels of the initial inflationrate and
unemployment is to alter the implicit weightson the unemployment and
inflation (nonlinear) terms toreflect long-run values.'7 Forexponential





'7lt should be remembered that thefollowing specifications of the objective function
Would have yielded unacceptable results inthe 1971-75 period.
tThe introduction ofT andin equations (9) and (II) serves to shift thecurves. In equation (10) it acts to rotate thecurves.
285
U
(a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d)
1965.1 4.9 5.0 5.0 4.7 2.1
.2 4.7 5.0 4.9 4.4 1.9
.3 4.4 5.l 4.8 4.3 1.1
.4 4.1 5.4 4.8 4.3 1.8
1966.1 3.9 5.6 4.8 4.3 3.1
.2 3.8 5.7 4.9 4.5 4.0
.3 3.8 5.6 4.8 4.4 3.6
.4 3.7 5.4 4.6 4.3 3.0
1967.1 3.8 5.3 4.6 4.0 2.8
.2 3.8 5.3 4.5 3.9 2.2
.3 3.8 5.2 4.4 4.6 4.0
.4 3.9 5.3 4.6 4.4 4.6
1968.1 3.7 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.6
.2 3.5 4.8 4.1 3.7 3.8
.3 3.5 4.5 4.0 3.9 4.3
.4 3.4 4.0 3.8 3.6 4.5
1969.1 3.4 3.7 3.7 3.7 4.1
.2 3.4 3.4 3.6 4.2 5.5
.3 3.6 3.3 3.7 4.3 5.9






























































objective function underlying column (b)= (-u-p)
objective function underlying column (c)[-(u0)2- objective function underlying column (d)=(_eU_eP)
20)
1
inflation that penalizedeviations above long-run valuesyield satisfactory
optimal solutions according tothe criteria set forth whileweak dichotomy
is not violated. Only byviolating weak dichotomycould quadratic or
exponential functions yieldsatisfactory results. Theimplications of maxi-
mizing these functionsunder more normal conditionsremain to be seen.
The period 1965:1-1969:4 waschosen for thispurpose.1
period is whether anyof the functions yieldsatisfactory results under
strong dichotomy.For this purpose thelinear, quadratic(truncated at
zero unemploymentand inflation) andexponentialfunctionsthat
penalized positive deviationsof unemployment andinflation from zero
were maximized.specifically, the functions are:
The above results indicatethat linear functionsof unemployment and




The results are givenin Table 2, Columns (b),(c), (d), respectively.They
display several characteristics.First, the average optimalunemployment
rate for the period islower as one moves fromthe linear to the quadratic
to the exponential case.This phenomenon followsfrom the observation
that the unemployment ratewas higher on averagethan the inflation rate
for the period and thatsuch relatively extremedeviations from zero in-
crease the relativeweight on unemployment inthe quadiatic and exponen-
tial cases. Unemployment washigher than inflation, on average,for the
period, because of initial conditions(i.e., low inflationaryexpectations) in
conjunction with the lag in thefull response of inflation tochanges in un-
employment. The relationshipbetween initial levelsof inflation and
desired levels is far from obvious.It is debatable whetherunemployment
should be kept low relative toits long-run level totake advantage of low
initial levels of inflation orkept high relative to itslong-run value to offset
high initial values.6 This issuewill be further exploredbelow. Second, the
horizon effect appears to dominatemost in the linear caseand next in the
quadratic case. This is related tothe fact that contemporaneousincreases
in inflation in response todeclines in unemployment arepenalized rela-
tively most heavily in theexponential case followed by thequadratic and
t5See Table 2. column (A) for thehistorical values of unemploymentand inflation.
it can be seen that the historicalvalues violate the criteria set forth.Namely the unem-
ployment rate is below 4 percentfor much of the period. However,it is believed by many
that the economy was pushed toohard in the mid-to-late 1960's, sothat the criteria are in
fact reasonable.
16This relates to the issue of whether thecriterion that unemployment be above4 per-
cent is arbitrary.
284TABLE 2
HISTORICAL AND MAXIMIZATIONRESULTS FOR A "NORMAL" PERIOD
column (a)=historical values
objective function underlying column(b)=(-u-p)
objective function underlying column (c)[-(u0)2- (,0)2)
objective function underlying column (d) (_eU_eP)
lastly linear. Thus, the net gain fromdecreasing unemploymentat the end
of the period is relatively lowest inthe exponential case.
An approach to specificationof the objective function thattakes ex- plicit cognizance of differences inthe levels of the initial inflationrate and unemployment is to alter the implicitweights on theunemployment and inflation (nonlinear) termsto reflect long-runvalues.'7For exponential and quadratic functionsthis could appear as:
8
71t should be remembered thatthe following specifications ofthe objective function would have yielded unacceptableresults in the 197 1-75 period.






(b) (c) (d) (b) (c) (d)
1965.1
.2
4.9 5.0 5.0 4.7 2.! 2.! 2.1 2.2
.3
4.7 5.0 4.9 4.4 1.9 1.7 1.7 2.1
.4
4.4 5.1 4.8 4.3 1.1 .6 .8 1.2
1966.1
4.1 5.4 4.8 4.3 1.8 1.0 1.3 1.7
.2
3.9 5.6 4.8 4.3 3.! 2.0 2.4 2.9
.3
3.8 5.7 4.9 4.5 4.0 2.6 3.1 3.4
.4
3.8 5.6 4.8 4.4 3.6 2.1 2.6 3.0
1967.1
3.7 5.4 4.6 4.3 3.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
.2
3.8 5.3 4.6 4.0 2.8 1.4 2.0 2.3
.3
3.8 5.3 4.5 3.9 2.2 .7 1.4 2.2
.4
3.8 5.2 4.4 4.6 4.0 2.4 3.1 3.2
1968.1
3.9 5.3 4.6 4.4 4.6 2.9 3.7 3.7
.2
3.7 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.6 1.6 2.4 3.4
.3
3.5 4.8 4.1 3.7 3.8 1.7 2.6 3.4
.4
3.5 4.5 4.0 3.9 4.3 2.1 3.0 3.4
1969.1
3.4 4.0 3.8 3.6 4.5 2.4 3.2 3.7
.2
3.4 3.7 3.7 3.7 4.1 2.0 2.8 3.6
.3
3.4 3.4 3.6 4.2 5.5 3.7 4.2 4.2
.4
3.6 3.3 3.7 4.3 5.9 4.3 4.7 4.5 3.6 3.0 3.5 3.7 5.4 4.0 4.2 4.4
(9) W= - e"]
(10) W= - e1]
(II) w[±2_±2] LU pj
TABLE 2
HISTORICAL AND MAXIMIZATIONRESULTS FOR A "NORMAL" PERIOD
column (a)=historical values
objective function underlying column(b)=
objective function underlying column (c)[-(u0)- objective function underlying column (d)
lastly linear. Thus, the net gain fromdecreasing unemploymentat the end
of the period is relatively lowest inthe exponentialcase.





71t should be remembered thatthe following specifications of theobjective function Would have yielded unacceptableresults in the 1971-75 period.




(a) (b) (c) (d)
1965.1 4.9 5.0 5.0 4.7 2.!
.2 4.7 5.0 4.9 4.4 1.9
.3 4.4 5.1 4.8 4.3 I.!
.4 4.1 5.4 4.8 4.3 1.8
1966.1 3.9 5.6 4.8 4.3 3.1
.2 3.8 5.7 4.9 4.5 4.0
.3 3.8 5.6 4.8 4.4 3.6
.4 3.7 5.4 4.6 4.3 3.0
1967.1 3.8 5.3 4.6 4.0 2.8
.2 3.8 5.3 4.5 3.9 2.2
.3 3.8 5.2 4.4 4.6 4.0
.4 3.9 5.3 4.6 4.4 4.6
1968.1 3.7 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.6
.2 3.5 4.8 4.! 3.7 3.8
.3 3.5 4.5 4.0 3.9 4.3
.4 3.4 4.0 3.8 3.6 4.5
1969.! 3.4 3.7 3.7 3.7 4.!
.2 3.4 3.4 3.6 4.2 5.5
.3 3.6 3.3 3.7 4.3 5.9























(b) (c) (d)wherei'=long run unemployment rate(natural rate)
=long-run inflation rate
The relative weights betweenunemployment and inflationequal unity
at the point (i7,)in equations (9) and (11).With the long-runPhillips
curve estimated to bevertical, any level of inflationis model consistent
with the natural rate of unemploymentin the long-run, given the appro-
priate monetary policy.Therefore, by setting ti at thenatural rate, the
decision whether to live with orattempt to change theeffects of initial
conditions can be resolved bysetting p high or low relative toinitial con-
ditions.'9For instance, settingp'high relative to initial conditionswould
permit unemployment to bepushed down fairly far, as long asinflation
does not rise excessivelyrelative top,and vice versa. Weak dichotomyis
not preserved, however,in this objective function, butthe extent to which
unemployment can declinewithout excessively exacerbatinginflation can
be left to the interactionbetween the objective functionand model con-
straints and is not arbitrarilylimited by a truncation point.
The results of maximizingequations (9), (10), and (11) aregiven in
Table 3, columns (a) through(c), respectively. They indicatethat infla-
tion, relative to a long runvalue, becomes more importantthan unem-
polyment, relative to its long-runvalue, as one moves from equation(9)
to equation (11). This canbe explained by the observationthat the second
derivatives become smaller, in absolutevalue, as one moves from equation
(9) to (11). Thus, it is less costly toincrease unemployment as one moves
from equation (9) to (Il).20
In the extreme, the initialvalues of inflation could beconsidered the
only level of inflation worthmaintaining.2' In this case, first differences of
inflation or deviations from the valueof inflation (or some average) just
prior to the period under controlcould be penalized. Thefollowing two
functions were maximized to illustratethis case:
W= l0,000*(p - p-i)2]
W=[-u21O*(pp*)2]
wherep=1.725, the value of inflation in1964:4
'91f the long-run Phillips curve is notvertical, then after the desired p is chosen,
should be selected that is consistent with paccording to the long-run Phillips curve.
201t should be noted that the optimal policywould be more stimulative it' theweight
between short-run and long-runinflation was smaller than that between short-runand long-
run unemployment relative tothe values implicit in these problems.
21This position could be taken by those who feelitis irrelevant to consider a long-
run deired value of inflation becausein the long-run the economy is homogenousof degree
zero with respect to the rateof change in prices given a natural:rateof unemployment. How-
ever, short-run variability ofinflation may be costly. Moreover, theunderlying spirit of this
position should be taken as the desire to see assmall a variance of the inflation rate as pos-




RESULTS OF MAXIMIZING OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS THAT TAKE
ExPuciT COGNIZANCE OF INITIAL CONDITIONS
objective function underlying column (a) =(_e45>-e'°)
objective function underlying column (b) =(_e14S_e*0)
objective function underlying column (c) (- 1/4.5 U2 - p2)
Multiplicative parameters on the inflation terms are greater than unity in
absolute value in these problems because smaller values that were tried in-
dicated solutions outside the feasible space, i.e., supply constraints were
hit and the model failed to converge to asolution.22In other words, if
insufficient weight is placed on the inflation terms a zero desired unem-
ployment rate dominates, especially since the horizon istruncated.23The
results are given in Table 4, columns (a) and (b), respectively. While the
equations are not comparable because of the different ëonstraints on the
policy instruments between them, itis clear that equation (13) comes
closer to satisfying the underlying spirit of the preferences it represents by
yielding a sequence of inflation with the smaller variance. This is not
especially surprising because equation (13) tends to fix the value around
which it penalizes deviations more concretely than does equation (12).
22The upper bound on EGF had to be lowered to 65. as well, for equation (12).
231n equation (12), since the level of p is relatively unimportant, with small niultipli-
cative weight on the inflation terms, decreasing the unemployment at one point during the
period under control could lead to a desired higher inflation, and theret'ore lower unem-
ployment, at another point in the period in order to minimize first ditierences of inflation.
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U
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
1965.1 5.0 5.0 4.0 2.1 2.1 2.4
.2 5.0 5.1 4.5 1.7 1.7 2.6
.3 5.1 5.3 5.8 .6 .6 .06
.4 5.4 5.7 6.2 1.0 .9 .7
1966.1 5,7 6.2 6.5 2.0 1.8 1.7
.2 6.2 6.8 6.8 2.5 2.2 2.3
.3 5.7 6.9 7.1 1.8 1.4 .7
.4 5.6 6.6 7.1 1.8 1.0 .7
1967.1 5.5 6.3 7.3 .7 .7 .7
.2 5.2 6.6 7.6 1.1 .5 -.2
.3 6.2 7.7 7.7 2.0 1.3 1.4
.4 6.1 7.7 7.9 2.0 1.3 1.9
1968.1 5.2 7.0 8.0 1.5 .6 .3
.2 5.1 6.9 8.0 1.4 .4 .06
.3 5.3 6.8 8.1 1.5 .4 -0.1
.4 4.9 6.5 8.0 1.4 .5 .03
1969.1 5.1 6.5 8.0 1.3 -.2 -.9
.2 5.9 6.8 7.9 1.6 .8 .4
.3 5.9 6.4 7.8 1.7 .9 .8
.4 4.8 5.5 7.7 1.3 .6 -.1TABLE 3
RESULTS OF MAXIMIZING OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS THAT TAKE
EXPLICIT COGNIZANCE OF 1IT!AL CONDITIONS
objective function underlying column (a) =
objective function underlying column (b) =(_e45_eI')
objective function underlying column (c) =(-1/4.5 U2 - p2)
Multiplicative parameters on the inflation terms are greater than unity in
absolute value in these problems because smaller values that were tried in-
dicated solutions outside the feasible space, i.e., supply constraints were
hit and the model failed to converge to a solution.22 In other words, if
insufficient weight is placed on the inflation terms a zero desired unem-
ployment rate dominates, especially since the horizon is truncated.23 The
results are given in Table 4, columns (a) and (b), respectively. While the
equations are not comparable because of the different constraints on the
policy instruments between them, itis clear that equation (13) comes
closer to satisfying the underlying spirit of the preferences it represents by
yielding a sequence of inflation with the smaller variance. This is not
especially surprising because equation (13) tends to fix the value around
which it penalizes deviations more concretely than does equation (12).
22The upper bound on EGE had to be towered to65.as well, for equation (12).
23n equation (12). since the level of p is relatively unimportant. with small multipli-
cative weight on the inliation terms, decreasing the unemployment at one point dudng the
period under control could lead to a desired higher inflation, and therefore lower unem-
ployment. at another point in the period in order to minimize first differences of inflation.
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U p
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
1965.1 5.0 5.0 4.0 2.1 2.1 2.4
.2 5.0 5.1 4.5 1.7 1.7 2.6
.3 5.1 5.3 5.8 .6 .6 .06
.4 5.4 5.7 6.2 1.0 .9 .7
1966.1 5.7 6.2 6.5 2.0 1.8 1.7
.2 6.2 6.8 6.8 2.5 2.2 2.3
.3 5.7 6.9 7.1 1.8 .4 .7
.4 5.6 6.6 7.! 1.8 1.0 .7
1967.1 5.5 6.3 7.3 .7 .7 .7
.2 5.2 6.6 7.6 Ii .5 -.2
.3 6.2 7.7 7.7 2.0 1.3 1.4
.4 6.1 7.7 7.9 2.0 1.3 1.9
1968.1 5.2 7.0 8.0 1.5 .6 .3
.2 5.1 6.9 8.0 1.4 .4 .06
.3 5.3 6.8 8.! 1.5 .4 -0.1
.4 4.9 6.5 8.0 1.4 .5 .03
1969.1 5.1 6.5 8.0 1.3 - .2 -.9
.2 5.9 6.8 7.9 1.6 .8 .4
.3 5.9 6.4 7.8 1.7 .9 .8
.4 4.8 5.5 7.7 1.3 .6 - .1
TABLE 3
RESULTS OF MAXIMIZING OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS THAT TAKE
ExPucIT COGNIZANCE OF INITIAL CONDITIONS
Multiplicative parameters on the inflation terms are greater than unity in
absolute value in these problems because smaller values that were tried in-
dicated solutions outside the feasible space, i.e., supply constraints were
hit and the model failed to converge to a solution.22 In other words, if
insufficient weight is placed on the inflation terms a zero desired unem-
ployment rate dominates, especially since the horizon is truncated.23 The
results are given in Table 4, columns (a) and (b), respectively. While the
equations are not comparable because of the different constraints on the
policy instruments between them, itis clear that equation (13) comes
closer to satisfying the underlying spirit of the preferences it represents by
yielding a sequence of inflation with the smaller variance. This is not
especially surprising because equation (13) tends to fix the value around
which it penalizes deviations more concretely than does equation (12).
22The upper bound on EGF had to be lowered to 65. as well, ['or equation (12).
231n equation (12). since the level of p is relatively unimportant, with small multipli-
cative weight on the inlIation terms, decreasing the unemployment at one point during the
period under control could lead to a desired higher inflation, and therefore lower unem-
ployment. at another point in the period in order to minimize first differences of inflation.
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U p
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
1965.1 5.0 5.0 4.0 2.! 2.1 2.4
.2 5.0 5.1 4.5 1.7 1.7 2.6
.3 5.1 5.3 5.8 .6 .6 .06
.4 5.4 5.7 6.2 1.0 .9 .7
1966.1 5.7 6.2 6.5 2.0 1.8 1.7
.2 6.2 6.8 6.8 2.5 2.2 2.3
.3 5.7 6.9 7.1 1.8 1.4 .7
.4 5.6 6.6 7.1 1.8 1.0 .7
1967.1 5.5 6.3 7.3 .7 .7 .7
.2 5.2 6.6 7.6 1.1 .5 -.2
.3 6.2 7.7 7.7 2.0 1.3 1.4
.4 6.1 7.7 7.9 2.0 1.3 1.9
1968.! 5.2 7.0 8.0 1.5 .6 .3
.2 5.! 6.9 8.0 1.4 .4 .06
.3 5.3 6.8 8.! 1.5 .4 -0.!
.4 4.9 6.5 8.0 1.4 .5 .03
1969.1 5.! 6.5 8.0 1.3 -.2 -.9
.2 5.9 6.8 7.9 1.6 .8 .4
.3 5.9 6.4 7.8 1.7 .9 .8
.4 4.8 5.5 7.7 1.3 .6 -.1
objective function underlying column (a) =(-e45-e")
objective function underlying column (b) =(_eU/45_eP)
objective function underlying column (c) =(-1/4.5 u2 -p2)TABLE 4
RESULTSOF MAXIMIZING OBJECTIVEFUNCTIONS THAT PLACE LARGE WEIGHTS
ON SMALLCHANGESININFLATION FROMINITIALVALUES
objective function underlying column (a) (-u2 - 10,000 (p - p_i)2)
objective function underlying column (b)(-u2 - I0*(pp*)2) wherep*- l.725,
the value of p in 1964.4.
The symmetry property of theinflation terms, imply that policy should
take advantage of low initial levels ordownward shocks to prices and be-
come stimulative.Consequently, these equations shouldyield optimal
sequences of unemployment thathave high variances. This is suggestedby
the results in Table 4 and shouldafortioribe the case as the weight on the
inflation term increases in absolute value, ceterisparibus.
Initial conditions need not be of concernfor some functional forms.
The relative weights of a truncated linearfunction, such as equation (5)
above, for instance, are independentof initial conditions, so that weak
dichotomy is maintained. Initialconditions would also affect the relative
weights equally in an exponentialfunction such as equation (4) above. It
is of interest, then, to see whether theresults of maximizing equations (5)
and (4) over the 1965-69 period areacceptable.
These are found in Table 5, columns(a) and (b), respectively. The
results of maximizing equation (5) arebasically acceptable, although the
truncation point may be exertingexcessive influence. This is especially
true for 1969. It is of interest to notethat compared to the resultsin Table
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TABLE 5
RESULTS OF MAXIMIZING OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS WHOSE RELATIVE WEIGHTS
ARE INDEPENDENT OF INITIAL CONDITIONS
objective function underlying column (a)=(-(u4.5) - p)
objective function underlying column (b)=-
2, column (b), the optimal' sequence of unemployment is much flatter.
This may be indicative of a possible general feature of the constrained
maximization solutions with the MPS model: when more stimulus is
called for at the end of the control period, more deflationary policy is
called for at the beginning of the period.24 The results of maximizing equa-
tion (4), on the other hand, are far from satisfactory. The horizon effect
appears to dominate, although why this should be so for this particular
functional form is not clear.
Conclusion
The specification of the objective function is a fairly intricate en-
deavor. It appears that short-run constraints must be taken into account
for many functional forms whose second derivatives are notzero. When a
24This observation is confirmed in all the results given in Tables 2 and 5. The rela-
tionship between early optimal high unemployment and later optimal low unemployment
has been shown to result from he distributed lagon past rates of change of prices in the
wage equation; see [3].
289
p
(a) (b) (a) (b)
1965.1 5.0 5.0 2.1 2.1
.2 4.9 5.0 1.8 1.7
.3 4.8 5.0 .8 .7
.4 4.8 5.0 1.3 1.2
1966.1 4.8 5.2 2.5 2.2
.2 4.9 5.2 3.1 2.9
.3 4.9 5.2 2.6 2.5
.4 4.8 5.2 1.9 1.6
1967.1 4.8 5.l 1.8 1.5
.2 4.9 5.3 1.1 .9
.3 4.9 5.5 2.6 2.2
.4 5.0 5.0 3.2 2.9
1968.1 4.8 4.5 2.1 2.3
.2 4.7 4.8 2.0 1.8
.3 4.8 5.0 2.2 1.8
.4 4.6 4.5 2.3 2.1
1969.1 4.5 4.2 1.7 1.7
.2 4.5 3.9 3.0 3.1
.3 4.5 3.4 3.4 4.1
.4 4.5. 2.8 2.8 4.2
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1965.1 5.0 5.0 2.! 2.1
.2 4.9 5.0 1.8 1.7
.3 4.8 5.0 .8 .7
.4 4.8 5.0 1.3 1.2
1966.! 4.8 5.2 2.5 2.2
.2 4.9 5.2 3.! 2.9
.3 4.9 5.2 2.6 2.5
.4 4.8 5.2 1.9 1.6
1967.1 4.8 5.! 1.8 1.5
.2 4.9 5.3 1.1 .9
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.3 4.8 5.0 2.2 1.8
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1969.1 4.5 4.2 1.7 1.7
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U plinear function is used,the horizon effect appearsto be an important
problem that must bedealt with. Truncationof the objective functionis
only a rough solution..Much work remains to bedone for the solutionof
the horizon problem.
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"ON THE SPECIFICATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND
INFLATION IN THE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION"
SOME COMMENTS
By D. A. LIVESEY
This paper is fascinating for the issues which it raises rather than for the
questions which it answers. It focuses upon the problems of specifying a
suitable obje.ctive function. In particular, it concentrates upon the trade-
offs between unemployment and inflation in an econometric model solved
over a time horizon of five years. Specifying objective functions is a nor-
mative exercise and yet the discussion in this paper tries to be as positive
as possible. This may be for one of two reasons; either economists have
been implicitly taught to avoid welfare economics because of the funda-
mental difficulties which it brings to light; or, it could be that this work
has evolved naturally out of the earlier simulation exercises which were a
standard feature of econometric model building. Even if neither of these
explanations is entirely correct, there is no escaping the fact that this
paper does not squarely face up to the issues which it addresses. Many of
the choices which the paper discusses have to be set firmly in a broader
context; some examples of how this can be done are given below. At the
same time, it has to be recognised that this paper signals that a significant
stage has been reached in the application of optimal control theory to
econometric models. At last those involved are addressing some of the
difficult issues involved in formulating economic policy. They are realising
that they cannot escape some of the fundamental choices simply by apply-
ing con&ol theory. For a long time, I think some were under the impres-
sion that many of the dilemas which arise in short-term economic policy
could be avoided by better planning and foresight. From this and other
papers it clearly emerges that there is no unambiguous golden age to
which all optimal policy is steered regardless of its implicit criterion func-
tion.
The beginning of section I is devoted to a discussion of the dichotomy
between preferences and constraints. Itis argued that the short time-
horizon of many econometric models forces the policy maker to abandon
the symmetry of the quadratic criterion. The imposition of one-sided
constraints weakens the dichotomy between preferences and constraints.
Whilst attempting to answer the criticism of the quadratic criterion,
Palash does not positively state why in a perfect world he would expect
preferences to be quadratic. It may be that he has in mind to argue that a
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291quadratic criterion is thecorrect one for regulation problems.Whilst this would be a satisfactoryargument, it would not solve all theproblems. We would still need to knowby which process the desiredtarget path, about which the optimalcontroller is to regulate theeconomy, is chosen. Palash opts for the obvioustargets of zero unemploymentand zero in- flation. It is reasonableto ask whether thesetargets are feasible given the
constraints implied by theeconometric model. If theyare not, then the outcome of any policy makingexercise is going to cruciallydepend upon the relative weights givento the deviations from targetof unemployment and inflation. Since, in the firstinstance, the process ofassigning these weights can only be arbitrary,the policy making exerciseis going to in- volve many computationalruns the outcomes of whichwill be judged qualitatively by the policymaker. The difficulties arisebecause the policy maker is concerned with twoproblems. Firstly, he isconcerned with es- tablishing the feasible regionwithin which his policyoptions lie. Secondly, and workers in this fieldmay soon be forced to admitthat this is the minor of the two problems,the policy maker wishesto regulate the be- haviour of the economy andsteer it towards the desiredfeasible path. In this context, the trade-offsbetween unemployment andinflation seem to be more a question of feasibilitythan a matter of regulation.Given the present state of the art, econometricmodels have equations whichdescribe what we might looselyterm the Phillips Curve. The taskof the policy
optimiser is in this context to spellout the feasible region impliedby these equations.
At the end of section I Palashdiscusses the relationshipbetween the timing of inflationary shocksand the length of the timehorizon. Every- thing which hesays is perfectly correct but he doesnot discuss the crucial role which terminalconstraints have to play in optimalcontrol theory. From optimal growth theorywe know that terminal constraintsare re- quired in finite horizonproblems to compensate for themyopic nature of the plan. The specificationof suitable terminal constraintshave proved to be no easier, for those whohave attempted it, than thespecification of a suitable objective function.
At the beginning of section II,we come to the heart of thematter. The sixth sentence reads:"First, if the optimal solutioncalls for extreme
worsening on the part ofone target which does not lead to substantialim- provements on the part of the othertarget, then that objective function
which yields this result will beconsidered undesirable." WhatPalash is saying at this point is that he hasa criterion function by which hejudges the results of optimal controlexercises and that this criterionfunction is not the objective function withrespect to which the model's solutionsare optimal. Clearly, if the solutionsare optimal, then the improvementin one target, even if it is not substantial,which has been bought at theex-
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292pense of a worsening of the other targetmust, by the standards of the ob-
jective function, be a better outcome. In rejectingthe results, what Palash
is telling us is that his implicit criterionfunction differs from the objective
function specified. This is perfectly reasonableif one holds, as I have al-
ways maintained, that thederivation of optimal policy is an iterative pro-
cedure. Until we have seen the results of oneexercise we cannot be sure
how we would wish to specify the exactconditions under which the next
exercise will be carried out. I would, however, haveliked to have seen
some recognition that animplicit criterion function was used in analyzing
the results.
At this point, Palash returns to the issue ofterminal constraints. If it
is indeed true that the level of unemploymentwhich was compatible in the
long run with a negligible rate of inflation wassomewhere between 4 and
4 percent in the 1960s then we would expectthis result to emerge from
the model. However, towards the end of theplanning period the economy
can sustain low levels ofunemployment because it will not pay the price,
in the years beyond the end of the time horizon,of inflation rising as a
result of these low unemployment levels. It is aproblem which has to be
settled using terminal constraints. Once again, wehave the problem of a
blurring of the trade-off between unemploymentand inflation. If 4 percent
unemployment is really the rate below whichthe economy cannot go
without generating inflation then why is it not thedesired target for un-
employment? Presumably, Palash would answerthat we cannot be certain
that 4 percent is the correct figure and thatthe figure would change from
one planning horizon to another.The great danger with all of this is that
so many implicit constraintswill have been imposed by the policy maker
that when we have the results we are unable toclearly distinguish between
what is feasible and what we have imposed upon thesolution.
Control and Management Systems Division
University Engineering Department
Mill Lane, Cambridge, England
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